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IN THE COURT OF COMOM PLEAS
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO

ALAN J. DAVIS, Special Administrator
of the Estate of
SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD
Plaintiff

• - -

Judge Ronald Suster
Case No. 312322

vs.

MOTION IN LIMINE TO
EXCLUDE SPECIFIC ITEMS OF
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE

THE STATE OF OHIO

Oral Hearing Requested

Defendant

Defendant hereby moves this court to exclude the specific items of physical
evidence that are not properly authenticated prior to their mention or use at trial for the
reasons set forth in the attached brief.

Respectfully Submitted,
William D. Mason
Prosecuting Attorney
Cuyahoga County

A. Steven Dever (0024982)
Dean Boland (0065693)
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
(216) 443-5870
Attorneys for Defendant

-

BRIEF

Introduction and Facts
The plaintiff intends to offer several items of physical evidence and the results of
tests conducted on those items during their case-in-chief. This motion involves the
exclusion of two of those items of physical evidence. The first item is purported to be a
bloodstained chunk of wood taken from the Sheppard home upon which plaintiffs expert
conducted DNA testing. The second item is purported to be a bloodstain taken from the
.wardrobe door in the bedroom where Marilyn Sheppard was murdered.
Law and Argument
The principles of the rule of evidence make authentication a prerequisite to

-

admissibility. (Evid. R. 901 ). (Emphasis added). This rule is consistent with prior Ohio
law. (See Steinle v. Cincinnati, 142 Oh. St. 550 (1944).
Rule 901(a) is the general provision regarding authentication. The rule represents
a special application of rule 104(b) on conditional relevancy. The trial court does not
decide whether evidence is authentic: the court decides only whether sufficient evidence
has been introduced to support a finding of authenticity. This requirement necessarily
means that the offering party must provide some evidence (as opposed to no evidence)
that the item is what it purports to be. If sufficient evidence has been adduced to support
a finding of authenticity, the evidence is admitted, and the jury then decides if the
evidence is authentic.
Evidence rule 104(a) provides "preliminary questions concerning the

-

admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court subject to the provisions of
subdivision b."

-

In part rule 104(b) provides ''when the relevancy of evidence depends upon the
fulfillment of the condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon ... the introduction of
evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition."
In short, a party seeking to introduce at trial evidence such as the purported wood
chip must authenticate the wood chip by proper testimony pursuant to rule 901(a). The
court, pursuant to rule 104, will determine as a preliminary matter whether the condition
of authentication has been satisfied before admitting the wood chip into evidence.
Evidence rule 901 provides that the authentication requirement imposes on the
offering party the burden of proving that an item of evidence is genuine-that it is what it
purports to be.

-

Prior to mentioning these items or the results of any tests performed on these
items, the plaintiff must authenticate them with testimony subject to cross examination.
That testimony must establish the whereabouts of these items from July 4, 1954 until they
arrive in the courtroom. Furthermore, the defendants have not had an opportunity even to
physically inspect these particular items.
In this case, Cynthia Cooper who was in possession of a purported wood chip
taken from the Sheppard home, has clearly indicated her hostility toward any questions
by the State of Ohio concerning her involvement in the investigation of the death of
Marilyn Sheppard. She has refused to detail her handling of this item. And she has also
failed to submit to a complete deposition on her involvement in the matter concerning the
death of Marilyn Sheppard. The State of Ohio believes that Cynthia Cooper will not
appear in the upcoming trial and the trier of fact will be deprived of information

-

concerning her involvement in the uncovering ofthis purported evidence. Without her

-

testimony and the testimony of others establishing the whereabouts of these items from
July 4, 1954 to the moment they arrive in the courtroom there is insufficient evidence as
a matter of law to authenticate these items.
For these reasons the plaintiff should be required to authenticate these items and
their whereabouts from July 4, 1954 until their presentation at trial. If they are unable to
do so they should be prohibited from even mentioning these items or the results of any
tests conducted on these items.

Respectfully Submitted,
William D. Mason
Prosecuting Attorney
Cuyahoga County

A Steven Dever (0024982)
Dean Boland (0065693)
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
(216) 443-5870
Attorneys for Defendant

-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The foregoing motion to exclude physical evidence was served upon the plaintiff
at the offices of Terry Gilbert, 1370 Ontario street, 17'h Floor, Cleveland, Ohio 44113 by
regular U.S. Mail this

,,,,.-f 5 day of December, 1999.

Respectfully Submitted,
William D. Mason
Prosecuting Attorney
Cuyahoga County

-

A. Steven Dever (0024982)
Chief Trial Counsel
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office
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*550 142 Ohio St. 550
53 N.E.2d 800, 27 0.0. 488
STEINLE

v.
CITY OF CINCINNATI.

4. EMINENT DOMAIN<?;= 2(1)
148
148I
Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2
What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2(1)
In general;
interference with
property rights.

No. 29600.
Supreme Court of Ohio.
Feb. 23, 1944.

1. NEW TRIAL<?;= 116.2
275
275III Proceedings to Procure New Trial
275kl 15 Time for Application
275kl 16.2 Commencement of time.
Formerly 275kl 16(2)
Ohio 1944
In action tried by court without jury, motion for
new trial filed within three days after trial court's
finding was filed for journalization was within time.
2. NEW TRIAL<?;= 117(2)
275
275III Proceedings to Procure New Trial
275kl 15 Time for Application
275kl l 7
Limitations as to Time or Term of
Court
275kl l 7(2)
Premature application.
Ohio 1944
In trial of cause to court without jury, filing of a
motion for new trial should await decision or finding
in which all material issues are finally disposed of.
3. EMINENT DOMAIN<?;= 271
148
Remedies of Owners of Property;
148IV
Inverse Condemnation
148k271 Recovery of damages.
Ohio 1944
Property owner seeking damages from city for
depreciation in value of property caused by escape
of water from defective sewer could present case on
theory that there was a temporary appropriation of
the property to public use. Gen.Code, § 11224;
Const. art. 1, § 19.

Ohio 1944
Any substantial interference with the elemental
rights growing out of ownership of private property
is considered a "taking" within constitutional
provision relating to taking property for public use.
Const. art. 1, § 19.
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial
constructions and definitions.
5. PARTIES<?;= 1
287
287I
Plaintiffs
287I(A) Persons Who May or Must Sue
287kl
Capacity and interest in general.
Ohio 1944
The right to maintain an action must be in the
person instituting it.
6. EMINENT DOMAIN<?;= 284
148
148IV
Remedies of Owners of Property;
Inverse Condemnation
148k284 Persons entitled to sue.
Ohio 1944
Where any taking or appropriation by city of
property resulting from escape of water from
defective sewer was temporary and had ended
before plaintiff bought the property, she could not
maintain action for compensation for temporary
appropriation of the property for public use, since
right to damages was in one who owned the land
when taking or injury occurred.
Gen. Code, §
11224; Const. art. 1, § 19.
7. EMINENT DOMAIN<?;= 284
148
148IV
Remedies of Owners of Property;
Inverse Condemnation
148k284 Persons entitled to sue.
Ohio 1944
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Plaintiff who bought property after temporary
taking of property for public use by city resulting
from escape of water from defective sewer could
derive no benefit from purported assignment of
claim for damages from former owner after plaintiff
had commenced the action, since plaintiff was not
"real party in interest" when she commenced action.
Gen.Code, § 11241.
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial
constructions and definitions.

8.

EVIDENCE~

370(11)

157
157X
Documentary Evidence
157X(D)
Production, Authentication, and
Effect
l 57k369
Preliminary Evidence for
Authentication
157k370
Necessity in General
157k370(11)
Instruments, and assignment,
indorsement, or guaranty thereof.

-

Ohio 1944
Assignment of claim for damages was not
admissible over defendant's objection, where proof
was not required as to its execution and authenticity,
which was condition precedent to its admission.

9. EMINENT DOMAIN~ 300
148
148IV
Remedies of Owners of Property;
Inverse Condemnation
148k294 Evidence
148k300
Weight and sufficiency.
Ohio 1944
Plaintiff was not entitled to damages for temporary
appropriation of property for public use resulting
from escape of water from city's defective sewer,
where there was lack of evidence that water
escaping from sewer actually permeated lot owned
by plaintiff, evidence merely tending to show that
water found its way into ground underlying nearby
properties, and a finding that plaintiff's land was
similarly invaded would rest on conjecture.
Gen.Code,§ 11224; Const. art. 1, § 19.
Syllabus by the Court.

-

1. In an action at law submitted to the court
without a jury, the filing of a motion for a new trial
is within time when done within three days after the
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court has filed for journalization a finding which
disposes of all the controlling issues in the case.
2. In an action against a municipality where
damages are claimed for the depreciation in value of
real property resulting from the percolation of water
into such [53 N.E.2d 801] property from a broken
sewer, after notice to the municipality of the defect,
the case may be presented on the theory of the
taking or appropriation of private property for a
public use, the allegations of the petition will so
permit. City of Norwood v. Sheen, Ex'r, 126 Ohio
St. 482, 186 N.E. 102, 87 A.LR. 1375, approved
and followed.
*551 3. The right to damages for injury to real
property by its temporary appropriation to a public
use is in the one who owns such property when the
appropriation and injury occur, and such right does
not ordinarily pass to a subsequent grantee who
acquires the property after such appropriation has
ceased.
4. To maintain an action, the plaintiff must have a
right to be enforced or a wrong to be prevented or
redressed.
5. An instrument purportedly assigning a claim for
damages is not admissible in evidence, over
objection, in the absence of preliminary proof as to
its execution and authenticity.
Appeal from Court of Appeals, Hamilton County.
Action by Mary B. Steinle against the City of
Cincinnati to recover damages for depreciation in
value of real property by reason of injuries caused
by escape of water from a broken and defective
sewer, commenced in a Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment was rendered for plaintiff, but on appeal
to the Court of Appeals the judgment was reversed
and judgment was rendered for defendant, 52
N .E.2d 80, and plaintiff appeal.--[Editorial
Statement.]
Judgment of Court of Appeals affirmed.
On June 20, 1939, Mary B. Steinle filed her
petition in the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton
county, claiming damages of $5,500 against the city
of Cincinnati, for depreciation in the value of her
real property by reason of injuries thereto caused by
the escape of water from a broken and defective
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-

sewer.
In her petition plaintiff alleged that in 1913
defendant obtained a ten-foot right of way from the
owners of the property to the west and north of her
lot and agreed to construct and maintain a sewer
without expense to the grantors of the right of way;
that defendant constructed the sewer and thereafter
failed tO' maintain it in good repair; that the sewer
became broken and clogged so that large quantities
of water escaped therefrom into the premises of the
plaintiff and into those of other nearby owners; that
in 1930 defendant was notified that the sewer was
out of repair; that beginning in 1933 the residence
structure of plaintiff began to settle as a result of the
water discharged from the sewer, washing out the
earth below the surface of the ground of her
premises and thereby causing the land to settle and
the house and garage to crack; and that in 1934
defendant repaired the sewer so that *552 by the
middle of the year 1935 plaintiff's house, garage and
the surface of her lot ceased to sink.
Answering, the defendant admitted it obtained the
right of way for the sewer in 1913, constructed a
sewer through such right of way and repaired it in
1934. It further averred that plaintiff's house was
constructed on a deep artificial fill; that any sinking
and cracking of the same was wholly attributable to
the settling of such fill; that he cause of action
alleged by the plaintiff did not accrue within four
years of the filing of the petition; and that plaintiff
did not acquire the described property until 1936, a
date subsequent to the accrual of the cause of action
set forth in the petition.
A jury being waived, the case was tried to the
court, largely on the bill of exceptions in another
cause of a kindred nature. It was stipulated between
the parties that, if plaintiff were entitled to damages,
the amount thereof would be $3,000.
On the trial plaintiff testified that she purchased her
property from Mrs. Theresa McLaughlin in March
of 1937. The bill of exceptions then shows:
'Q. I hand you a paper Mrs. Steinle and ask you
what that is or do you know about the giving of that?
A. No I do not.

-

'Mr. Dickerson: Well, may it please to court; I
wish to introduce this in evidence.
It is an
assignment of any right of claim of Theresa Ann
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McLaughlin against the city of Cincinnati to the
witness Mary B. Steinle for damage to the property
at 138 Warner street, Cincinnati, Ohio.'
The instrument bore date of December 13, 1941.
Its introduction was objected to by counsel for the
city. It was marked for identification and the court
reserved ruling on its admissibility and validity.
Later it was admitted, and counsel for the city took
exception thereto.
The court rendered a memorandum opinion dated
August 27, 1942, announcing a decision[53 N .E.2d
802] in favor of the *553 plaintiff, but leaving
open for future determination the question raised by
the answer as to the right of the plaintiff to maintain
the action.
On October 15, 1942, counsel for plaintiff filed
this written opinion without any order of the court to
do so. Then, on October 29, 1942, the court
entered a finding for the plaintiff, which recited that
on October 28, 1942, there was further presentation
and argument on the question reserved, 'upon
consideration of all of which the court does find in
favor of the plaintiff and does find that the plaintiff
should recover against the defendant, the city of
Cincinnati, the sum of three thousand dollars
($3,000), together with her costs herein expended.'
Defendant's motion for a new trial and its motion
for judgment notwithstanding the finding were filed
within three days after the entry of the above
finding.
These motions were overruled and
judgment rendered for plaintiff in the sum of $3,000
with interest.
An appeal from such judgment was prosecuted to
the Court of Appeals, whereupon plaintiff filed a
motion to dismiss the appeal and to strike the bill of
exceptions from the record because no proper
motion for a new trial had been filed within three
days after the decision and finding of the trial court
on August 27, 1942.
Both branches of the motion were overruled and,
upon a consideration of the case on its merits, the
judgment of the trial court was reversed and final
judgment entered for the defendant.
Allowance of the motion for certification brings the
case to this court for review.
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E. C. Hauer and R. T. Dickerson, both of
Cincinnati, for appellant.
John D. Ellis, City Sol., Ed. F. Alexander, Nathan
Solinger, and Robert J. White, all of Cincinnati, for
appellee.

*554 ZIMMERMAN, Judge.
[l] No error was committed by the Court of
Appeals in its holding on the procedural question.
The trial court made no complete and final
disposition of the matter in plaintiff's favor until its
finding of October 29, 1942, which was filed for
journalization on that date and the motion for a new
trial filed within three days afterwards was within
time. See In re Estate of Lowry, 140 Ohio St. 223,
42 N.E.2d 987; State ex rel. Curran v. Brookes,
142 Ohio St. 107, So N.E.2d 995.
[2] The generally accepted rule appears to be that
in the trial of a cause to the court without the
intervention of a jury, the filing of a motion for a
new trial should await a decision or finding in which
all the material issues are finally disposed of. 39
American Jurisprudence, 184 Section 181; Southern
Colonization Co. v. Howard Cole & Co., 185 Wis.
469, 201 N.W. 817.
[3] As to the merits, plaintiff, to avoid the fouryear limitation for the bringing of an action as
prescribed by Section 11224, General Code,
presented her case on the theory that, by the escape
of the water into her land from the defective
underground sewer, there was a temporary
appropriation of the property to a public use, and
she was entitled to prevail on taht basis within the
principles stated in City of Norwood v. Sheen, Ex'r,
126 Ohio St. 482, 186 N.E. 102, 87 A.L.R. 1375.
In the Sheen case the rule was announced that
where a municipality deposits sewage from a sewer
upon private property, such property is thereby
subjected to a public use, and a taking occurs within
the meaning of Section 19, Article I of the
Constitution of Ohio, for which damages may be
claimed. See 18 American Jurisprudence, 759,
Section 134.

-

[4] It will be observed that in connection with cases
involving the appropriation of private property to a
public use, Ohio has adopted the liberal view that
'any substantial interference with the elemental
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rights *555 growing out of ownership of private
property is considered a taking.' Smith v. Erie R.
Co., 134 Ohio St. 135, 142, 16 N.E.2d 310, 313,
and the cases therein cited.
Assuming, for the purposes of discussion, that the
appropriation theory is supportable under the
allegations of the petition, is plaintiff entitled to
succeed?
[5] It is elementary that the right to maintain an
action must be in the person instituting it. Here,
plaintiff's claim for damages is based on the
depreciation in value of the property, caused by the
She
water escaping from the broken sewer.
purchased the property in 1937 as it then was. The
city had repaired the sewer in 1934 and had stopped
the leakage. According to the allegations of the
petition, 'thereafter the ground on plaintiff's
premises and to the west thereof gradually dried out
and by [53 N.E.2d 803] the middle of the year 1935
the house, garage and surface of plaintiff's lot
ceased to sink.'
[6] Any taking or appropriation by the city was
temporary and had ended before plaintiff bought the
property. Such right of action as there might have
been under the appropriation theory would have
belonged to the one who owned the property when
the appropriation and injury happened.
The general rule is that the right to damages for the
taking of land or for injury to land is in the one who
owns the land when the taking or injury occurs, and
does not ordinarily pass to a subsequent grantee. 29
Corpus Juris Secundum, Eminent Domain, p. 1115,
§ 202; 30 Corpus Juris Secundum, Eminent
Domain, p. 101, § 389.
See 18 American
Jurisprudence, 864, Section 231. Any right on the
part of the subsequent grantee to damages is
dependent on a new taking or injury after his
acquisition of title. 30 Corpus Juris Secundum,
Eminent Domain, p. 102, § 390.
[7] [8] Plaintiff can derive no benefit from the
purported
*556
assignment from Theresa
McLaughlin in 1941 of the claim for damages. In
the first place, Section 11241, General Code,
requires that 'an action must be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest.' Plaintiff did not
answer that description when she brought her action
in 1939. In the second place, if the assignment may
be accorded effect on any basis, it is not properly in
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As a
evidence over the defendant's objection.
condition precedent to its admission, proof was
required as to its execution and authenticity, which
was not furnished. 17 Ohio Jurisprudence, 601,
Section 495; Walsh v. Barton, 24 Ohio St. 28, 41;
20 American Jurisprudence, 776, Section 922; 32
Corpus Juris Secundum, Evidence, p. 476, § 625.
[9] Finally, the Court of Appeals found a lack of
evidence, as a perusal of the bill of exceptions
herein discloses, that water escaping from the
broken sewer actually permeated the lot now owned
by plaintiff. True, evidence is present tending to
show that such water did find its way into the
ground underlying nearby properties, but a finding
that plaintiff's land was similarly invaded would rest
on conjecture.
Defendant offered persuasive testimony to the
effect that any uneven settling of the buildings in
proximity to the sewer, causing them to warp and
crack, was due to the loosely filled ground on which
they were built. Some of the defendant's witnesses
also testified that excessive moisture in the ground
adjacent to the sewer was attributable to drainage
conditions disassociated from the sewer.
Upon the record, our conclusion is that plaintiff
failed to establish an enforceable claim against the
city, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
therefore affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
*557. WEYGANDT, C. J., and MATTHIAS,
HART, BELL, WILLIAMS, and TURNER, JJ.,
concur.
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HART, Judge (concurring).
I concur in the syllabus and judgment of the court
in this case, but in doing so I desire to express my
view as to the rule of law set out in the second
paragraph of the syllabus.
A clear distinction must be maintained between an
abatable nuisance temporarily affecting the use of
real property, and a similar nuisance which, during
its continuance, has permanently injured and
diminished the value of the property.
The remedy for a wrongful invasion of the former
type, such as the overflow of vacant land by water,
is an action for damages limited by the four-year
statute of limitation, in which there may be
recovered the amount of the resultant diminution in
the rental value of the property. The remedy for a
wrongful invasion of the latter type, such as the
permanent destruction of buildings by their
submergence in water or sewage escaping from
defective drains or pipes constructed and maintained
by a municipality, is an action to recover damages
for the partial appropriation of the property for a
public use, limited by the 21-year statute of
limitation, in which action there may be a recovery
for the permanent depreciation of the property,
measured by the difference between the value before
and the value after the damage or injury.
On the theory that the second paragraph of the
syllabus in this case relates to a situation of the latter
type, and is descriptive of an action to recover
damages for permanent injury to the real estate of
the appellant, I concur in that paragraph as well as
other paragraphs of the syllabus.
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